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Abstract
This paper investigates spatial determinants of FDI location. In particular, FDI in neighboring
countries and foreign market potential are two variables it focuses on. The sample includes a panel
of 27 transition countries in 1993-2007.
The spatial links are found positive and economically large. Omitting spatial FDI leads to a
serious misspeci￿cation of the model and biases estimation of the coe￿cient of the foreign market
potential variable, which is found to be a non-robust determinant of FDI location. As the analysis
of sub-samples of the data indicates, the FDI complementarity is stronger for the CIS countries
and for earlier period.
The spatial complenmentarity is stronger for disaggregated data such as bilateral FDI ￿ows
and industry level data. I ￿nd substantial heterogeneity of spatial FDI spillovers across indus-
tries. Spillovers are large and positive for services sectors and non-sighi￿cant or even negative for
manufacturing sectors.
JEL No. C21, F21, P33
Keywords: foreign direct investments, spatial econometrics, transition.
1. Introduction
During the last two decades, the global economy experienced an unprecendeted growth of foreign
direct investment (FDI) ￿ows that considerably outperformed growth of trade ￿ows and growth
of GDP. According to Navaretti et al. (2004), the global FDI between 1985 and 1999 increased at
a rate 17.7 percent per year, while the global GDP grew 2.5 percent, and the global export grew
5.6 percent. Given such a strong FDI growth globally, the rise of the Eastern Europe and Central
Asia (ECA) region as one of the major destinations of FDI, increasing the share of FDI in￿ow
to the region from virtually zero before 1990 to 6.2 percent of global FDI in￿ows in 2002-2004,
is even more outstanding. What factors explain growing attention of multinationals to the ECA
region? The literature suggests that the opening up of economies, rapid economic and institutional
transformation, combined with a relatively low unit labor cost and educated population were very
important1.
At the same time, economic and institutional changes within a country do not exhaust the
potential list of factors that a￿ect the FDI location decisions. The main goal of the paper is to
investigate FDI determinants that go beyond country characteristics. First, there is a third-country
e￿ect that, with a few exceptions ((Blonigen et al., 2007, Baltagi et al., 2007)), is ignored in the
literature on FDI location. The FDI in￿ows in the neighboring countries can have a spillover e￿ect
on FDI in￿ow in a country that can be either negative or positive. On the one hand, when countries
A and B compete to host FDI, developments that improve investment climate in the country A
can have a negative e￿ect on FDI in￿ows to the country B due to competition across countries.
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1The determinants of the FDI activities in the region were discussed, among others, by Bevan and Estrin (2004),
Carstensen and Toubal (2004), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
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economies, and learn from experience of other MNCs that entered the market earlier. In this case,
a positive spillover e￿ect of can be observed. Second, proximity to large markets, resulting in good
market access, is an important factor that attracts FDI, especially in the case of export platform
driven FDI to countries with small internal markets but with good access to large regional markets
(Head and Mayer, 2004).
I study how two spatially determined variables ￿ the FDI stock accumulation in the neigh-
boring countries and foreign market potential ￿ in￿uence the FDI in￿ows. Blonigen et al. (2007)
investigated a similar question, looking at the spatial determinants of US outbound FDI activity
and found that the spatial interactions are not robust to inclusion of country ￿xed e￿ects and
sensitive to the sample of countries one examines. However, their study did not take into account
the interaction of US multinationals with multinationals from other countries, which is likely to
underestimate the spatial interactions. In addition their sample covered only 35 FDI destinations,
primarily high-income OECD countries, which also could lead to underestimation of the spatial
interactions, because, as demonstrated in this paper, the spatial interactions are more important
for developing countires with lower levels of FDI activity.
To study the spatial interactions at various stages of development, I have chosen transition
countries in 1993-2007. It gives the advantage of looking at countries that have started with vir-
tually zero FDI stock and gradually developed into economies with high foreign presence, opening
widely to the globalization processes. In addition, the transition countries vary substantially across
important economic and policy dimensions, including the speed and scope of reforms, market po-
tential, and industrial structure. The main ￿ndings of the paper are as follows. First, there is a
robust, economically and statistically signi￿cant association between the spatial lag of accumulated
FDI stock and the FDI in￿ows, with elasticity ranging from 0.3 to 0.54. The e￿ect is the strongest
for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries in the 1993-2000 period, while it is
not signi￿cant for the Eastern European (EE) countries in 2001-2007. Second, omitting the spatial
interaction term substantially overestimates the impact of other spatially correlated variables ￿
foreign market potential and progress of reforms. Importantly, the foreign market potential is not
a robust determinant of the FDI in￿ows once the spatial spillovers are accounted for. The foreign
market potential plays an important role for the EE countries in 2001-2007, but it is not signi￿cant
either for the whole sample or for the CIS countries. Third, the spatial interactions are stornger
for more disaggregated data, as the analysis of bilateral ￿ows and industry level ￿ows reveals.
Finally, the spatial interactions are more important for emerging industries rather than for
established ones. For example, they are stronger for services sectors, which were underdeveloped
under socialism, and signi￿cantly weaker in manufacturing, which was relatively well-developed.
These ￿ndings point that the spatial interactions between MNCs are more important at the early
stages of development when the overall stock of FDI is low. At that stage, any new entrant creates
a substantial positive spillover e￿ect because it provides new goods and services which probably
were not available before and reduces information uncertainty for other MNCs, considering entering
the market. Over time, however, the market matures and additional foreign companies bring lower
bene￿ts due to diminishing returns to scale while impose higher costs on other foreign companies
due to hightened competition.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the FDI deternimants mentioned in
the literature. Section 3 sets up the model and discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses
the sources of data. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 presents an additional set of
results for more disaggregated FDI data. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2. Determinants of FDI
2.1. Spatial determinants of FDI
A choice of FDI location is often a multi-stage process that involves evaluation and comparison
of investment opportunities in di￿erent countries, creation of the shortlist of countries, and ￿nally
2a head-to-head competition of physical locations within the shortlisted countries. Under such
circumstances, high economic growth, regional integration, and rapid institutional improvements
in one country could in￿uence FDI in neighboring countries. The sign and magnitude of the spatial
correlation between FDI would depend on the dominant mode of FDI activities for the whole region.
Broadly speaking, the literature on FDI distinguishes between vertical and horizontal FDI modes.
A vertical MNC fragments production into stages and locates production facilities to minimize
the cost of production. Helpman (1984) is one of the examples of the vertical model of FDI.
A horizontal MNC, on the other hand, is a multiplant ￿rm that replicates the same activities
in di￿erent locations. The main motive for the horizontal FDI is the search for new markets
that are cheaper to serve through local production rather than through export. Markusen (1984)
is an example of a work that models horizontal FDI. More recent works emphasize that MNCs
become increasingly multi-mode, complex types of ￿rms that combine vertical and horizontal FDI
(Yeaple, 2003). As an example, Ekholm et al. (2007) present an export platform mode of FDI ￿ a
modi￿cation of the horizontal FDI which aims to serve neighboring countries by exporting.
Blonigen et al. (2007) argue that the simple vertical and export platform FDI would generate
negative spatial correlation. Locating a plant in one country under both modes means that a
similar plant is not being built in a neighboring country. The complex vertical FDI, on the other
hand, would generate positive spatial correlation. Other things being equal, it is better to locate
di￿erent stages of production close to each other. There are evidence of substantial agglomeration
e￿ects on FDI (Amiti and Smarzynska Javorcik, 2008, Head and Mayer, 2004, Carstensen and
Toubal, 2004) which would lead to a positive spillover e￿ect from one country to another due to
increasing returns to scale at industry level, wider choice of suppliers, and more developed services
sector.
Another important spatial characteristic of the country that in￿uences FDI in￿ows is market
potential. Head and Mayer (2004) analyzed the patterns of location of Japanese MNCs in Europe
and found the positive impact of market potential on location choice. However, Head and Mayer
mentioned that the market potential alone could not explain entirely the tendency of ￿rms to
agglomerate. It should be mentioned that they did not include the spatial lag of FDI in their model
speci￿cation, which might partially explain the missing agglomeration factors. More importantly,
as shown in this paper the ommited variable could bias their result.
The main goals of this paper is to estimate the sign of the spatial interactions and determine
what is the dominant FDI motive to the region. There are several papers that deal with the
third-country e￿ect on FDI by means of spatial econometrics. Coughlin and Segev (1999) is the
￿rst study that estimated a model of FDI determinants with the spatial autoregressive process
in the dependent variable using data on the Chinese provinces. They found that a higher level
of FDI in the adjacent provinces increased FDI, pointing to a positive external agglomeration
e￿ect. Baltagi et al. (2007) found a substantial third-country e￿ect in US outward FDI stocks in
1989-1999, however, they did not include a term that would capture the spatial FDI e￿ect.
The closest to the approach implemented in this paper is Blonigen et al. (2007) who estimates
a spatial autoregressive model of FDI that also include a spatial lag of GDP for a panel of US
outbound FDI activity into 35 countries in 1983-1998. The coe￿cient of the spatial lag of FDI
in their baseline result is positive and signi￿cant while the coe￿cient of the spatial lag of GDP
is surprisingly negative. However, they mention that their main result is sensitive to inclusion
of the ￿xed e￿ects and to the choice of the estimated sample. However, as menitioned earlier,
their ￿ndings might be driven by the fact that they ignore interactions of the US multinationals
with MNCs from other countries and by not accounting for in￿uence of countries that are not
included in the sample. In addition, Bloningen et al. focus on developed countries while this paper
demonstrates that the spatial FDI stock in￿ucence on the FDI in￿ows is stronger in emerging
economies.
2.2. Traditional determinants of FDI
Ideally, it is important to separate the FDI in￿ows based on the MNC mode, but it is very
di￿cult to implement due to lack of data. Markusen and Maskus (2002) empirically test which
3set of theories ￿ on horizontal, vertical, or complex FDI ￿ is better explained by the data. They
nest a horizontal and vertical model within a unifying ￿knowledge-capital model￿ and test the
unifying model on US data. In the tests, the restricted horizontal model performs as good as the
unrestricted model that indicates that the horizontal FDI model captures all FDI determinants.
The tests overwhelmingly reject the vertical model. Other authors con￿rmed that the majority of
FDI is of the horizontal type, hence, in this work the most attention is paid to factors that attracts
the horizontal FDI. Based on these ￿ndings, the model presented in the next section is based on
the horizontal FDI motives.
What does attract FDI to a speci￿c country? A market size and broader regional market poten-
tial are both important determinants of the horizontal FDI (Head and Mayer, 2004). Membership
in the regional integration agreements is also important because it facilitates the market access for
the member countries and diverts investment from countries that are not integrated. Egger and
Pfa￿ermayr (2004), who speci￿cally studied how EU integration in￿uenced FDI into and within
the EU, report an anticipation e￿ect ￿ FDI in￿ows pick up after the integration is announced but
before it actually takes place. Trade and transport costs can a￿ect FDI both ways, depending on
the FDI type (Brainard, 1997, Carr et al., 2003). Since aggregate ￿ows are dominated by horizon-
tal FDI, seeking to supply new markets, literature views such FDI as a substitute for trade ￿ows,
hence, higher trade barriers induce tari￿ jumping FDI (Ekholm et al., 2007). If, on the other hand,
the MNC searches for a location with low factor costs, the higher trade barriers would have a neg-
ative e￿ect on FDI in￿ows. Production costs and factor endowments, including capital, labor, and
human capital, are particularly important determinants of the vertical FDI. A vertically integrated
MNC would locate the capital intensive stages of production in capital abundant counitres and
labor intensive stages in labor abundant counties (Helpman, 1984).
Turning to the literature on the FDI determinants in developing and transition countries, the
factor that is robustly signi￿cant and economically important in a number of studies is the quality of
institutions protecting the rule of law, encouraging competition, and creating favorable investment
climate. Alfaro et al. (2008) show that, during 1970-2000, low institutional quality was the leading
explanation of why capital doesn’t ￿ow to poor countries. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) stress
that the MNC activities are strongly encouraged by good governance infrastructure, a concept
that includes political, institutional, and legal environment. Javorcik and Wei (2009) look at the
interaction between the level of corruption and ￿nd that high corruption lowers inward FDI and
shift the organizational structure towards joint ventures because local partners have a required
skills to cut through bureaucracy.
Focusing on transition countries gives an opportunity to look how rapidly changing environ-
ment in￿uence FDI. Bevan and Estrin (2004), who investigated the determinants of FDI in￿ows
in transition countries, stress that in addition to traditional factors mentioned in the literature,
an EU accession announcement increases levels of FDI in prospective countries. Carstensen and
Toubal (2004) ￿nd that the extent and mode of privatization and country risk both play an im-
portant role in determining FDI in transition countries. Campos and Kinoshita (2003) using a
panel of 25 transition countries between 1990 and 1998 report that institutions, natural resources,
agglomeration economies, and labor costs are main determinants of FDI in￿ows.
3. Methodology
3.1. Model
Consider N locations, each having two sectors. A traditional sector, H; produces a homogeneous
good using a constant return to scale technology YH = LH, where L is labor ￿ the only factor
of production. A modern sector, F, consists of MNCs that bring new technologies and products.
The modern sector produces di￿erentiated goods indexed l = 1:::M under increasing return to
scale technology. Each variety can be either produced at home or imported from another location.
However, transportation is costly. Labor is mobile across sectors and ￿rms within one location,
but not across di￿erent locations. Total amount of labor, Li is exogenously given in each location.
4A representative consumer has the following utility function






An MNC, located in country i, has a technology l = Fi + ciq2, where Fi is a ￿xed cost that
includes an overhead production cost, f, and an additional cost of forming a subsidiary in a
foreign country, fi, ci is a marginal cost, q is an output, and l is amount of labor. Under the
monopolistically competitive structure of the market with trade costs, ij, and possibility to trade















ni is the number of varieties produced in country i, as well as the number of ￿rms in the modern
sector. To start production in country i, a multinational ￿rm incurs Fi and earns the aggregate
















is the Krugman market potential (Krugman, 1992). Assuming free entry







To determine the equilibrium number of MNCs in the country, the full employment in the
economy is used






Productivity of a modern sector ￿rm varies from one location to another and depends on the




with @'i(:)=@(njFj) > 0;8j = 1:::N. The cost speci￿cation captures the idea of Marshallian
economies of scale where external size of the modern sector has a positive e￿ect on the ￿rm level
productivity. For example, other MNCs located in the neighboring countries can have an impact
2Each MNC is associated with one product variety l. All ￿rms located in the same country i produce according
to the same technology. For ease of presentation, I drop the product index.
5on the cost of production by providing a better supplier access in upstream industries due to tighter
competition and wider choice of inputs (Amiti and Smarzynska Javorcik, 2008) 3.












Further assume that the productivity is represented by the following functional form




where, jj < 1 is a parameter that captures degree of spatial dependence, Ai is a productivity
factor, wij is an exogenous weight that relates spatial units i and j, 0  wij  1, and wii = 1. i
is a disturbance term.
Suppose that FDI in other locations are at the equilibrium level, F













Finally, taking logs on both sides of (2) the estimation equation looks as follows
ln(niF













ln(ci0) + ui (3)
where i = 1
1 [ln(=) + (   1)ln(Ai)],  =
( 1)
(1 ) , and ui =
( 1)
(1 )i.
Based on the discussion, the following prediction can be made. The elasticity of FDI to a





= wij  0 (4)
3.2. Estimation strategy
I build on Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Kapoor et al. (2007) and estimate an empirical
counterpart of (3) that includes the spatial lag of the dependent variable as well as the market
potential and other controls, construction of which is discussed in the next section. The model has
i = 1;:::;N countries and t = 1;:::;T time periods. For a time period t, the speci￿cation can be
written in a compact form as
lnFDI(t) = X(t) + WlnFDI(t) + u(t);jj < 1 (5)
or
lnFDI(t) = Z(t) + u(t) (6)
3Alternatively, positive spillovers that increase ￿rm-level productivity can come through technology di￿usion (see
Keller (2004) on the role of FDI in spreading of technology and spatial nature of di￿usion).
6where lnFDI(t) is an N1 vector with observations on the dependent variable in year t, X(t) is an
N K matrix on K explanatory, non-stochastic variables. W is an N N time-invariant weighting
matrix, with elements wijare known and non-stochastic. The element WlnFDI is referred to as the
spatial lag of lnFDI.  is a K 1 vector of estimated parameters and  is a scalar that measures
the degree of the spatial dependence. In equation (6), Z(t) = [X;WlnFDI] is a N  (K + 1)
matrix, and  = (0;)0 is a (K + 1)  1 vector of estimated parameters.
The error term u is modeled as a random error component
u(t) =  + v(t) (7)
where u(t) is an N  1 vector of error terms, consisting of time-invariant component  and time-
varying component v(t)4. Speci￿cally, I assume that the i   th element of u(t) has the following
form uit = i + vit where i is i:i:d: over i with (0;2
) and vit is i:i:d: over both i and t with
(0;2
v).
Stacking observations for all time periods, the speci￿cation is
lnFDI = X + WlnFDI + u = Z + u (8)
with lnFDI = (LnFDI(1)0;:::;LnFDI(T)0)0, X = (X(1)0;:::;X(T)0)0, Z = (Z(1)0;:::;Z(T)0)0 and
u = (u(1)0;:::;u(T)0)0.
The error term can be written as
u = (eT 
 W) + v (9)
where v = (v(1)0;:::;v(T)0)0 and  = (1;:::;N)0 is an N  1 vector of country-speci￿c error
components, IT is a T T identity matrix, and eT is a T 1 vector of ones. Among other things,
the model implies that E(uu0) = 2
(eTe0
T 
 IN) + 2
vINT = 
u.
Consider the following transformation of (8)

 1=2
u lnFDI = 
 1=2








Obviously, the spatial lag of lnFDI is an endogenous variable correlated with the error term
u. In fact, any element of lnFDI depends not only on its exogenous characteristics X
i and its
disturbance u
i, but also on the rest of the elements of X and u. To demonstrate this, the model
(11) can be rewritten in a reduced form
lnFDI = GX + Gu (12)
where G = (I   W) 1.
Under assumption jj < 1, it can be shown that G =
P1
i=0 iWi and the expected value of
lnFDI can be presented as an in￿nite sum
E(lnFDIjX) = X + WX + 2W2X + ::: (13)
Importantly, the orthogonality condition E(WiXu) = 0 holds.
Given the orthogonality condition holds and lnFDI depends on the spatial lags of exogenous
variables, the spatial autoregressive model makes instruments readily available. The optimal set
4The previous version of the paper (Shepotylo, 2005) had a spatial autoregressive error structure similar to
Kapoor et al. (2007). Accounting for the spatial autocorrelation in the error does not signi￿cantly in￿uence the
estimation of the coe￿cients in the model. More importantly, as shown by Badinger and Egger (2009), to estimate
the parameters of such model with a good precision, one would need around 200 spatial units.
7of instruments for Z = [X;WY ] is Hopt = [X;E(lnFDIjX)], however, the following subset
of instruments, H = [X;WX] is su￿cient set of instruments for estimation. The spatial 2SLS
estimator is de￿ned as
^  = ( ^ Z0Z) 1 ^ Z0lnFDI (14)
where ^ Z = H(H0H) 1H0Z.
4. Data and variables
To test the model, I de￿ne the following variables, listed in Table 1, and discuss their construc-
tion. I build a panel of 27 transition countries over the period 1993-2007. The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) compiles annual data on foreign direct invest-
ment in￿ows in millions of current US dollars. Figures for FDI in￿ow values are converted into
millions of 1990 US dollars using US GDP de￿ator taken from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) of the World Bank to make the data comparable across time periods. The FDI in￿ow in
the log form is further used in the analysis as the dependent variable 5.
The gross domestic product in millions of current US dollars taken from the WDI is converted
into millions of 1990 US dollars, de￿ated by the US GDP de￿ator. Labor costs are approximated
by the monthly wage in local currency in manufacturing, available from the International Labor
Organization,6 converted to the real monthly wages by implied PPP conversion rates between
local currency and US dollar provided by World Economic Outlook database constructed by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
To construct a measure of governance quality that includes progress of economic and institu-
tional reforms, I use the Transition Report, published by the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). The Transition Report provides a broad, comprehensive, and comparable
across countries description of the progress of reforms in all transition countries, starting from 1989.
An integral measure of governance quality is computed as a simple average of the indicators of
government reforms in large scale privatization, small scale privatization, enterprise restructuring,
prices liberalization, trade and exchange rate liberalization, competitiveness, banking sector, and
￿nancial sector. All indices are measured on a scale from 1 to 4.3 with higher numbers representing
a greater progress.
Because of their heterogeneity, transition countries have di￿erent sectoral composition of FDI.
To account for a high volume of investment in oil and gas industries in Russia, Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, I control for natural resources endowment of the economy. The
measure of importance of the oil industry is log of proven oil reserves reported by BP 7. Finally, I
construct an EU indicator variable, with 1 meaning EU membership and 0 otherwise, to control
for the impact of EU enlargement process on FDI.
4.1. Spatial variables
I construct two spatial variables that measure FDI activities in the neighboring countries. The
￿rst variable, the spatial lag of log of FDI in￿ow, WlnFDIit; is constructed using information
on FDI in￿ows to all countries in the world. Using all available data, I control for the impact of
out-of-sample countries on FDI in￿ows to transition economies, taking into account the impact of
5Several observations of FDI in￿ows are less than or equal to zero. I de￿ne the dependent variable as lnFDI =
ln(1 + FDI). The choice of the additive constant does not change the main conclusions of the paper. There are
also 4 observations with substantially negative FDI in￿ows that are dropped from the analysis.
6In rare cases, where the data is not available, I use either data for monthly wages in all activities or o￿cial data
from country statistical o￿ces (for Russia and Belarus).
7Separate data for oil and gas is aggregated into one variable measured in millions of barrel using a conversion
factor provided in the BP report ￿ 1bcm of gas is equal to 6.6 millions barrel equivalent. The report includes only
countries with substantiall amout of oil and gas resources, it also gives information on total amount of oil and gas
in all other countries in the region. To compute values for countries not included in the report, I assume that the
remaining totals are distributed among all those countries proportionally to their geographical sizes.
8Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Ln FDI 5.847 1.824 0 10.522 376
Spatial lag of Ln FDI stock 6.075 0.913 3.74 8.129 376
Ln GDP per capita 7.362 1.054 4.718 9.665 376
Ln of population 15.778 1.081 14.109 18.816 376
ln of Foreign market potential 20.605 0.971 18.488 22.999 376
EU membership 0.09 0.287 0 1 376
EBRD index 2.878 0.655 1.166 4 376
Ln of proven oil and gas reserves -1.428 2.735 -3.912 5.904 376
Ln of Real wage 6.060 0.749 3.649 7.512 376
Notes: A panel of 27 transition countries from 1993 to 2007. Data on FDI in￿ows is from UNCTAD. GDP and population
are from WDI. EU membership is constructed based on o￿cial announcments of European Comission. EBRD index is the
simple average of eight Transition indicators published by EBRD, higher numbers represnt better progress. Oil and gas
reserves are from the BP report. Real wage is computed based on ILO data on monthly wages in manufacturing. Nominal
variables are converted to real indicators having 1990 as the base year.
FDI in￿ows to, for example, Germany, on FDI in￿ows to the Czech Republic. The second variable,
the spatial lag of log FDI stock WlnFDIstockit; is computed in similar fashion using information
on FDI stock. The stock of FDI is constructed using the stock of FDI in 1992 measured in US
dollars of 1990 as the initial value of the stock of foreign capital. Further, the stock of FDI in
1993-2007 is computed based on the perpetual inventory model Kit+1 = (1 )Kit +FDIit where
K is the stock of foreign capital,  is the depreciation rate, and FDI is the FDI in￿ow measured
in US dollars of 1990. The rate of depreciation is taken equal to 0:06 as it is usual in the literature
(i.e. Nadiri et al. (1997)).
I use both spatial variables in empirical analysis, because each has its advantages and disad-
vantages. The use of the spatial lag of log FDI in￿ow better captures the spatial autoregressive
(SAR) process speci￿cation, while the usage of the spatial lag of log FDI stock is a better proxy
for the theoretical model.
4.2. Foreign market potential
The foreign market potential is computed according to the methodology developed by Head
and Mayer (2004). At the ￿rst stage, the gravity equation is estimated on the panel of bilateral
exports between 183 countries in the world for which data is available from the COMTRADE
database. Since the COMTRADE data for most transition countries starts in 1996, I add the
trade data in 1993-1995 from the Direction of Trade database by the IMF. The gravity speci￿cation
that includes exporter and importer ￿xed e￿ects as well as variables that capture trade costs is
estimated separately for each year
lnXij = EXi + IMj +   ln(distij) + Bij +   Colonyij +   Languageij + ij
where Xij is export from i to j, EXi and IMj are exporter and importer ￿xed e￿ects, distijis a
bilateral distance, Bij is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if countries share a common
border and 0 otherwise, colonyij is an indicator variable that takes value of 1 if one of the countries
was a colony of another and 0 otherwise, and languageij is an indicator variable that takes value
of 1 if countries share common language and 0 otherwise. All data is available from the Centre
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). At the second stage, the foreign
market potential is calculated as FMPit =
P
j6=i ^ ijexp( ^ IMj), where ^ ij = dist
^ 
ijexp(^ Bij). The
results presented in Table 2 are consistent with prior expectations about the magnitude of the
foreign market potential; namely, FMP is higher for countries that have large economies nearby
and for countries that are closer to more developed EU countries.
9Table 2: Foreign market potential, trillions of 1990 US dollars
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Albania 1.17 0.65 0.51 2.62
Armenia 0.5 0.28 0.19 1.12
Azerbaijan 0.46 0.23 0.23 1
Belarus 1.19 0.61 0.6 2.71
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.57 0.92 0.65 3.66
Bulgaria 1.46 0.88 0.38 3.41
Croatia 1.94 1.07 0.88 4.34
Czech Republic 4.42 2.33 1.65 9.65
Estonia 1.09 0.55 0.55 2.39
Georgia 0.47 0.24 0.23 1.06
Hungary 1.93 1.12 0.81 4.58
Kazakhstan 0.43 0.24 0.11 1.01
Kyrgyz Republic 0.31 0.19 0.12 0.74
Latvia 1.11 0.58 0.52 2.5
Lithuania 1.2 0.63 0.54 2.68
Macedonia, FYR 1.18 0.67 0.5 2.66
Moldova 0.87 0.51 0.38 2.11
Poland 5.01 2.11 1.85 9.73
Romania 0.91 0.47 0.43 1.96
Russian Federation 0.42 0.21 0.18 0.88
Serbia and Montenegro 1.23 0.75 0.37 2.91
Slovak Republic 2.67 1.4 1.03 5.69
Slovenia 3.54 1.99 1.39 8.12
Tajikistan 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.6
Turkmenistan 0.26 0.14 0.12 0.59
Ukraine 0.71 0.37 0.27 1.59
Uzbekistan 0.23 0.12 0.09 0.5
Notes: Foreign market potential variable is constructed by projecting the gravity model coe￿cient estimates on importer’s
￿xed e￿ects and bilateral trade costs: distance, commond border, common language. The gravity model is estimated on
the sample of 183 countries in the period from 1993 to 2007. The table reports the period average value of the foregin
market potential, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value for the period.
104.3. Weighting matrices
In the baseline model speci￿cation, I de￿ne weights between countries i and j, wij, to be
the inverse of the square distance between them 8, where distance, dij; is the weighted distance
measure , computed using city-level data to assess the geographic distribution of population inside
each country. The diagonal elements of the weighting matrix are set equal to zero. Furthermore,
I scale each row i of the weighting matrix by ki = 1=
PN
j=1;j6=i 1=d2
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Row-normalization is necessary to ensure the system stability. Under this speci￿cation, the system
converges to a global spatial equilibrium when jj < 1 (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). In addition,
the row-normalized weighting matrix gives a clear economic interpretation of the spatial lag of a
variable as its weighted average.
The choice of the weighting matrix can be criticized as being ad hoc and not backed by the
theory. The criticism would underemine the results if they are sensitive to the choice of the weight-
ing matrix. To explore how the estimation is in￿uenced by the weighting matrix, I consider an
alternative, contiguity-based matrix speci￿cation. The contiguity-based weighting matrix attaches
more importance to the direct neighbors, while disregards in￿uence of the countries that do not
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where ki = 1=
PN
j=1 wij;8i = 1;2;:::;N
5. Results
5.1. Baseline model
Table 3 presents the results of the regression of FDI in￿ow on the spatial lag of FDI stock and
set of independent variables. The most important result is the substantial spatial complementarity
of FDI in the region ￿ higher accumulation of the FDI stock in the region induces FDI in￿ows in
countries of the region. The positive coe￿cient of the spatial lag of log FDI stock points that a
MNC gains from accumulation of technology brought by other MNCs, wider choice of multinational
suppliers, and as a results, less costly inputs more than it loses due to competition across countries
and across di￿erent MNCs. The result is robust to di￿erent model speci￿cations. The elasticity
of FDI in￿ows to the spatial lag of FDI stock ranges from 0.3 to 0.54. In the baseline model
speci￿cation, reported in column (1), the elasticity is 0.42 that is close to the mean value across
di￿erent model speci￿cations. The positive and signi￿cant coe￿cient of EBRD index across all
model speci￿cations highlights importance of good governance in attracting MNCs, a factor that is
8The inverse distance squared weights give higher weights to closer countries. I also estimated and presented the
results of the model with weights inversly related to distance, which assign higher importance to in￿uence of remote
countries. The choice of the weighting matrix did not have impact on the conclusions of the paper.
11found to be one of the most important in other studies as well 9. Another factor that is important in
almost all speci￿cations is energy resources endowment of a country that induces resource-seeking
FDI in￿ows.
Table 3: Aggregate FDI in￿ows in transition countries: 1993-2007. Spatial lag of FDI stock.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spatial lag of ln FDI stock 0.41** 0.34** 0.32** 0.54** 0.40** 0.30** 0.32**
(0.087) (0.084) (0.089) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
Ln GDP per capita 0.61** 0.30* 0.53** 0.78** 0.65** 0.69** 0.44*
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19)
Ln of population 0.37* 0.10 0.28 0.31* 0.40* 0.33* 0.71 0.21
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (1.28) (0.17)
Ln of foreign market potential 0.24 0.87** 0.47** 0.40* 0.011 0.26 0.22 0.57*
(0.19) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24) (0.27)
EU membership -0.25 -0.22 -0.22 -0.25 -0.31 -0.30 -0.23 -0.52*
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.25)
EBRD index 0.83** 1.30** 0.93** 0.89** 0.74** 0.90** 1.09** 0.88**
(0.17) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.25) (0.19)
Ln of proven oil and gas reserves 0.25** 0.41** 0.30** 0.28** 0.22** 0.27** 0.32 0.33**
(0.071) (0.063) (0.069) (0.070) (0.075) (0.068) (0.39) (0.082)
Ln of real wage -0.26 -0.025 -0.014 -0.22 -0.35* -0.27 -0.17 -0.21
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.20)
L.Ln GDP per capita 0.39**
(0.13)
Infrastructure sector reform 0.046 -0.038
(0.14) (0.14)
Ln human capital -0.34 -0.12
(0.54) (0.48)
Constant -13.0** -18.8** -15.03** -14.4** -9.55* -12.9** -18.9 -15.6**
(3.05) (2.85) (3.01) (2.76) (4.29) (3.87) (20.1) (3.50)
R-sq. within 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.77
R-sq. bitween 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.91
R-sq. overall 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.87
Observations 376 376 376 376 361 361 376 130
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
All regressions are estimated by 2SLS method using spatial lags of exogenous varaibles as instruments. Dependent variable
in all regressions is ln FDI in￿ow. Column (1) reports the baseline regression. Column (2) reports results without the spatial
lag of FDI Stock. Column (3) includes lagged GDP per capita. Column (4) reports results with a measure of an infrastructure
sector reform. Column (5) includes a measure of human capital. Column (6) includes infrastructure and human capital.
Column (7) includes country ￿xed e￿ects. Column (8) reports results for 3-year-averaged data.
The baseline model reported in column (1) shows that the two measures of internal market
potential ￿ GDP per capita and population size ￿ are both positive and signi￿cant, indicating
presence of FDI driven by the market seeking motive. The coe￿cient of the foreign market potential
is positive but not signi￿cant, which cast doubts that the export platform FDI motive played an
important role on MNC location strategy in the region. The coe￿cient of the EU membership is
9See, for example, Bevan and Estrin (2004), Campos and Kinoshita (2003), Carstensen and Toubal (2004)
12negative but not signi￿cant, perhaps indicating the interplay of two opposite forces ￿ a positive
e￿ect of better market access and negative e￿ect due of lower trade barriers which encourages more
trade relative to FDI. The real wage has an expected sign but is not signi￿cant.
Column (2) of Table 3 highlights how a model that does not control for the spatial depen-
dence in FDI biases the results in a non-trivial manner. The coe￿cient of the foreign market
potential becomes positive, signi￿cant, and more than three times larger than in column (1). The
misspeci￿cation of the model causes an upward bias because both FDI in￿ow and foreign market
potential are positively correlated with the omitted spatial lag of log FDI stock. Similarly, the
model without the spatial lag of FDI overstates the impact of domestic reforms on FDI in￿ows by
failing to account for the positive spillovers of good governance in neighboring countries on FDI
in￿ows (Kelejian et al., 2008).
The GDP per capita can be directly infuenced by FDI stock, especially in small open eceonomies
with large capital in￿ows. To deal with a potential endogeneity problem, column (3) reports the
equation with the lagged value of GDP per capita ￿ the coe￿cient of the spatial lag of log FDI
stock remains positive and signi￿cant, albeit slightly smaller than in column (1). Next, columns
(3), (4), and (5) add controls for the impact of public infrastructure and human capital on FDI
in￿ows, factors that turn out to be non-signi￿cant for the MNC location decision in the region. The
equation in column (7) reports results with country ￿xed-e￿ects. Controlling for time invariant
unobserved characteristics does not change the main result, although factors that have low time
variability, population and resources endowment, lose their signi￿cance. Finally, column (8) reports
results of the estimation of the baseline model on lower frequency data computed using three-year
averages. The foreign market potential becomes positive and signi￿cant, while EU membership
dummy turns signi￿cantly negative, indicating an impact of substitution of FDI for exports for
countries located within the EU.
5.2. Spatial autoregressive model (SAR)
In Table 4, I report the same set of equations as in Table 3, but with the spatial lag of the
FDI in￿ows as a measure of the spatial dependence, a speci￿cation, which is more in-line with the
notion of a classical spatial autoregressive process, but not as good approximation of the theoretical
model. The coe￿cient of the spatial lag of log FDI in￿ow variable tends to be higher than for the
spatial lag of log FDI stock variable. Other results go parallel with the results presented in Table
3.
Global and partial e￿ects
The interpretation of the coe￿cients of the SAR model presented in Table 4 is di￿erent from
the interpretation of the coe￿cients in the traditional regression models. The SAR simultaneously
determines the allocation of FDI in￿ows in all countries within the region. A change in one of the
exogenous variables in one country changes the whole spatial allocation of FDI in the region.
To illustrate this point, consider the e￿ect of the improvement of the quality of governance in
all countries of the region on the FDI in￿ows. Suppose that the EBRD index in each country of
the region has increased by one standard deviation, which is 0:67. The partial e￿ect of the increase
is calculated according to the formula i;p = 100 
pFDIi
Et[FDIi(t)] = EBRD  0:67  E[EBRDi(t)].
The global e￿ect, however, is di￿erent because it takes into account endogenous adjustments in
FDI in￿ows, which reinforce themselves through the positive spillover feedback. The global e￿ect,
derived from the reduced form (12), is computed as i;g = 100
gFDIi
Et[FDI(t)] = EBRD 0:67Gi
E[EBRD(t)], where Gi is an i   th row of the matrix G = (I(N)   W) 1and Et(EBRD(t)) is
an N  1 vector of country speci￿c mean values of the EBRD index.
Figure 1 reports the partial and global e￿ects of the universal improvement in the quality of
governance, modelled as a one standard deviation increase in EBRDindex, on FDI in￿ows for the
coe￿cients from the baseline regression in Table 4. The average global e￿ect is more than 50 percent
increase in FDI in￿ows, which is more than twice higher than the partial e￿ect. Turkmenistan
would have gained the most in relative terms, because it has the lowest period average EBRD
13Table 4: Aggregate FDI in￿ows in transition countries: 1993-2007. Spatial lag of FDI in￿ows.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln FDI Ln FDI Ln FDI Ln FDI Ln FDI Ln FDI Ln FDI Ln FDI
Spatial lag of ln FDI in￿ow 0.57** 0.48** 0.50** 0.77** 0.68** 0.47** 0.45**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15)
Ln GDP per capita 0.55** 0.30* 0.52** 0.69** 0.64** 0.62** 0.43*
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19)
Ln of population 0.36* 0.10 0.28 0.33* 0.37* 0.34* 0.15 0.20
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (1.26) (0.17)
Ln of foreign market potential 0.081 0.87** 0.32 0.19 -0.22 -0.066 0.037 0.45
(0.21) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26) (0.29)
EU membership -0.16 -0.22 -0.14 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.14 -0.49
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.25)
EBRD index 0.88** 1.30** 0.97** 0.87** 0.80** 0.88** 1.09** 0.90**
(0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) (0.19)
Ln of proven oil and gas reserves 0.25** 0.41** 0.30** 0.27** 0.24** 0.26** 0.31 0.33**
(0.070) (0.063) (0.070) (0.064) (0.074) (0.068) (0.38) (0.081)
Ln of real wage -0.24 -0.025 -0.13 -0.22 -0.33* -0.30* -0.17 -0.18
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.20)
L.Ln GDP per capita 0.34**
(0.13)
Infrastructure sector reform 0.054 -0.035
(0.13) (0.14)
Ln human capital -0.65 -0.51
(0.56) (0.51)
Constant -9.71** -18.8** -12.1** -10.9** -3.52 -6.00 -6.32 -13.4**
(3.35) (2.85) (3.32) (3.07) (4.85) (4.51) (20.5) (3.90)
R-sq. within 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.78
R-sq. bitween 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.90
R-sq. overall 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.86
Observations 376 376 376 376 361 361 376 130
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
All regressions are estimated by 2SLS method using spatial lags of exogenous varaibles as instruments. Dependent variable
in all regressions is ln FDI in￿ow. Column (1) reports the baseline regression. Column (2) reports results without the spatial
lag of FDI Stock. Column (3) includes lagged GDP per capita. Column (4) reports results with a measure of an infrastructure
sector reform. Column (5) includes a measure of human capital. Column (6) includes infrastructure and human capital.
Column (7) includes country ￿xed e￿ects. Column (8) reports results for 3-year-averaged data.
14Figure 1: Partial and global e￿ects of better governance on FDI in￿ows
Notes: E￿ect of a one standard deviation increase in EBRD index in all countries on FDI in￿ows. Partial e￿ect
is computed keeping FDI in￿ows to other countries ￿xed, while global e￿ect takes into account spatial spillovers
and endogenous nature of FDI in￿ows. The e￿ects are computed based on the results from Table 4, column (1).
























Notes: E￿ect of a one percent increase in Poland’s GDP on FDI in￿ows in countries of the region. The map is
truncated, Central Asia and Caucasus countries are not shown
16index in the sample, 1:3, and a one standard deviation increase in the index would have meant 50
percent improvement in quality of governance, which would induce correspondingly high increase
in FDI in￿ows ￿ 44 percent increase for the partial e￿ect and 76 percent increase for the global
e￿ect. Interestingly, there are instances of reversing order of country pair comparisons based on
the partial and global e￿ects. According to the partial e￿ect estimates, Belarus would have gained
33 percent FDI in￿ows and Bosnia and Herzegovina 28 percent. However, globally Belarus would
have gained 48 percent increase in FDI in￿ows and Bosnia and Herzegovina 56 percent. The
reversion re￿ects the impact of location of a country relative to all other countries in the region,
and it indicates that Bosnia and Herzegovina is placed better than Belarus from the MNC location
standpoint.
The model can also be applied to investigate the propagation of exogenous shocks from one
country to another. Consider, for example, a shock that increases GDP per capita of Poland by 1
percent. The partial e￿ect of the shock is 0:55 percent higher FDI in￿ows to Poland. The global
e￿ect, displayed at Figure 2, is 0.91 percent increase in FDI in￿ows to Poland and higher FDI
in￿ows to the other countries of the regions. The e￿ect is higher in countries that are closer to
Poland, and it is getting smaller with greater distance.
5.3. Results for sub-samples and di￿erent weighting matrices
As one might argue, it would be misleading to pool Eastern European (EE) and Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) countries in one model due to di￿erent motives for investments in the
two sub-regions. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report results of the baseline model speci￿cation
for CIS and EU sub-samples separately. The results con￿rm that the FDI motives are indeed
di￿erent between these two groups. The FDI to the CIS region are driven by low real wages and
natural resource abundance. The importance of the complex vertical FDI to the region can also
be deduced from the higher value of the coe￿cient of the spatial lag of log FDI stock. FDI to EE
countries, on the other hand, are driven by larger internal market, by positive even though not
signi￿cant impact of the foreign market potential, and are more in￿uenced by better governance.
I also consider the possibility of the structural break after the ￿nancial crisis in Russia in 1998.
Columns (3) and (4) split the sample into two periods. The ￿rst period starts at the beginning
of transition and lasts until 2000. The second period, characterized by more rapid FDI growth,
lasts from 2001 to 2007. While the ￿rst period is characterized by high spatial dependence of
FDI and importance of the internal market, the second period is characterized by smaller spatial
dependence, higher importance of foreign market potential, and more resource-driven FDI in￿ows.
Columns (5)-(8) further break the sample into four sub-groups by sub-region and sub-period. The
results are consistent with the results for the larger sub-groups.
These ￿ndings point that the spatial interactions between MNCs are more important at the
early stages of development when the overall stock of FDI in the region is low. At that stage,
any new entrant creates a substantial spillover e￿ect because it provides new goods and services
which probably were not available before and reduces information uncertainty for other MNCs,
considering entering the market. Over time, however, the market matures and additional foreign
companies bring lower bene￿ts due to diminishing marginal returns and impose higher costs on
other foreign companies due to hightened competition.
The choice of the weighting matrix, as it turns out, does not impact results. Table 6 reports
results of the baseline regression for di￿erent speci￿cations of the weighting matrix, W. Column
(1) reposts the results with the inverse distance squared weighting matrix for reader’s convenience.
Column (2) reports results with inverse distance weights. Column (3) reports results with the
contiguity-based W. The main ￿nding stands as before ￿ high accumulation of the FDI stock in the
neighboring countries is a strong, positive, and signi￿cant predictor of FDI in￿ow. The robustness
of results to the weighting matrix speci￿cation gives more con￿dence in the main conclusion of the
paper about complementarity of FDI in￿ows across the transitioning economies.
17Table 5: Aggregate FDI in￿ows by countries and time periods.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CIS EE 1993- 2001- CIS CIS EE EE
2000 2007 1993-2000 2001-2007 1993-2000 2001-2007
Spatial lag of ln FDI stock 0.63** 0.27** 0.48** 0.33 0.68** -0.049 0.29* 0.64
(0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.28) (0.16) (0.45) (0.14) (0.45)
Ln GDP per capita 1.04** -0.016 0.46* 0.22 0.77** 0.53 0.021 -0.029
(0.19) (0.26) (0.20) (0.23) (0.27) (0.29) (0.36) (0.40)
Ln of population -0.038 0.73** 0.46* 0.032 -0.014 -0.31 1.07** 0.63*
(0.14) (0.23) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.34) (0.30)
Ln of foreign market potential -0.18 0.44 0.12 0.90** -0.27 1.81** -0.00095 0.22
(0.29) (0.25) (0.24) (0.33) (0.34) (0.60) (0.37) (0.43)
EU membership 0.015 -0.17 0.12
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
EBRD index 0.77** 1.30** 0.90** 0.83** 0.76** 1.02** 1.60** 0.77*
(0.18) (0.25) (0.20) (0.24) (0.22) (0.29) (0.34) (0.36)
Ln of proven oil and gas reserves 0.29** 0.094 0.19* 0.45** 0.27** 0.58** -0.088 0.17
(0.061) (0.13) (0.083) (0.089) (0.070) (0.11) (0.19) (0.18)
Ln of real wage -0.48* -0.11 -0.25 0.055 -0.26 -0.62 -0.21 0.25
(0.20) (0.27) (0.21) (0.31) (0.26) (0.46) (0.38) (0.40)
Constant -1.14 -19.7** -11.6** -19.8** 0.62 -28.1** -16.9** -17.2**
(4.60) (3.48) (3.60) (4.29) (5.44) (9.05) (5.18) (4.60)
R-sq. within 0.64 0.70 0.47 0.65 0.47 0.71 0.52 0.59
R-sq. beetwin 0.95 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.86
R-sq. overall 0.83 0.81 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.88 0.82 0.77
Observations 163 213 195 181 87 76 108 105
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Dependent variable in all regressions is ln FDI in￿ows. Estimated by 2SLS with spatial lags of exogenous variables as instruments.
CIS sample includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. EE sample includes Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
Table 6: Aggregate FDI in￿ows with alternative weighting matrices.
(1) (2) (3)
Ln FDI Ln FDI Ln FDI
Spatial lag of ln FDI stock 0.41** 0.39** 0.33**
(0.087) (0.094) (0.080)
Ln of foreign market potential 0.24 0.34 0.33
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
R-sq. overall 0.81 0.81 0.79
Observations 376 376 376
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Dependent variable in all regressions is ln FDI in￿ows.
Column (1) reports results for inverse distance squared W.
Column (2) reports results for inverse distance W.
Column (3) reports results for contiguity based W.
186. Spatial spillovers in more dissagregate data
6.1. Bilateral FDI ￿ows
Aggregate FDI ￿ows hide important information on the FDI source, which might introduce
biases into the estimation results. Geographical proximity between the source and host countries,
a common border and common language, colonial ties are all determinants of bilateral FDI ￿ows.
When aggregating the data, this information is lost in the error term, which is likely to be spatially
correlated with some of the explanatory variables. For example, other things being equal, proximity
to Germany could be the most important determinant of FDI in￿ows into the Czech Republic.
Geographical proximity to Germany, in turn, correlates with the decision to join the EU, and with
the market potential variable ￿ variables that are considered as exogenous and not correlated with
the error in the baseline model speci￿cation.
To check the robustness of the results reported in the previous section, I estimate the gravity
based equations with the bilateral FDI stock 10 as the dependent variable and additional controls
￿ log of distance, log of GDP per capita and log of population in the source country, colonial past,
common border, and common language available from the CEPII database on bilateral distances.
The number of host countries is smaller than in the previous section; the sample includes bilateral
FDI stocks of 87 source countries in Eastern European countries and Ukraine in 1993 to 2007,
available from The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) database on FDI.
The ￿ndings presented in Table 7 are consistent with the results of the previous section, with
the main distinction that the elasticity of bilateral FDI stock to the spatial aggregate FDI stock is
larger than the elasticity of the aggregate FDI in￿ows, ranging from 0.64 to 0.82. The coe￿cient of
the foreign market potential is positive and signi￿cant in the model with pair ￿xed e￿ects, reported
in column (2). The coe￿cient of the market potential is also signi￿cant for the 2001-2007 sub-
sample, which probably re￿ects growing importance of horizontal FDI relative to vertical FDI. The
traditional controls of gravity have expected signs, the elasticity of FDI with respect to distance
is negative and grow over time which re￿ects growing regionalism within the EU, countries that
share common border and colonial ties in the past have more FDI, while common language is not
a signi￿cant determinant of FDI.
6.2. Disaggregated FDI: industry level data
Table 8 reports the results of the baseline model speci￿cation separately estimated for each of
the NACE 2-digit level industry. The dependent variable is the log of FDI stock in country i in
industry k available from the wiiw FDI database. The sample includes Eastern European countries
(excluding Serbia and Montenegro), Russia, and Ukraine. To save space, Table 8 reports only the
estimates of the coe￿cients of the spatial lag of log FDI stock and log foreign market potential.
There are several interesting ￿ndings that leave open questions for the further research. First, the
spatial lag of log FDI stock is positive and signi￿cant in sectors that mostly produce intermediate
goods and resources ￿ agriculture, mining and quarrying, leather, wood, fuel, metals. Second,
transport equipment, rubber and plastic, other mineral products, and other manufacturing prod-
ucts sectors show elements of the export platform FDI strategy, having negative coe￿cient of the
spatial lag of log FDI and positive coe￿cient of log foreign market potential. Third, the spatial lag
of log FDI stock is signi￿cantly positive in non-tradables and services sectors ￿ construction, trade,
hotels and restaurants, ￿nancial intermediation, real estate and business activities. This result is
consistent with the notion that the spatial spillovers are more important for development of infant
industries. Services sector was considerably underdeveloped under socialism due to ideological
and strategic reasons ￿ the priority was given to investing in physical capital in capital intensive
industries at the expense of the labor intensive sectors.
10Unfortunately, the data coverage for bilateral FDI in￿ows is small. In addition, there is a large number of zero
and negative FDI in￿ows. Therefore, I report results for the bilateral FDI stock from country j to country i as the
explanatory variable.
19Table 7: Bilateral FDI in￿ows in tranistion countries: 1993-2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spatial lag of ln FDI stock 0.82** 0.69** 0.78** 0.64**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.23)
Ln GDP per capita i -0.28** 0.079 -0.025 -1.49**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.18)
Ln of population i 0.30** -0.036 -0.18 0.60**
(0.11) (1.05) (0.11) (0.16)
Ln GDP per capita j 0.50** -1.06** 0.39** 1.26**
(0.046) (0.10) (0.041) (0.068)
Ln of population j 0.31** -0.36 0.25** 0.44**
(0.033) (0.54) (0.029) (0.044)
Ln of foreign market potential 0.082 0.81** -0.088 0.49*
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22)
EU membership 0.023 -0.023 0 -0.17**
(0.065) (0.067) (0) (0.060)
EBRD index 0.35** 0.30* 0.34** 1.58**
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.20)
Ln of proven oil and gas reserves 0.11 -2.53** 0.36** -0.15
(0.068) (0.22) (0.067) (0.098)
Ln of real wage 0.63** 0.64** 0.12 0.97**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.21)
Ln distance -0.46** -0.29** -0.67**
(0.065) (0.057) (0.089)
Common border 0.55** 0.51** 1.10**
(0.21) (0.19) (0.29)
Colony 0.88** 0.66* 1.17**
(0.31) (0.28) (0.41)
Common language -0.69 -0.85 -0.78
(0.52) (0.48) (0.70)
Constant -20.1** -15.8 -6.20** -36.7**
(1.94) (18.5) (1.89) (2.72)
R-sq. overall 0.45 0.0044 0.35 0.46
Observations 7321 7321 3796 3525
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Dependent variable in all regressions is ln FDI stock of country j in country i. Column (1)
reports the baseline gravity speci￿cation. Column (2) includes pair ￿xed e￿ects. Column (3)
reports the baseline model in 1993-2000. Column (4) reports the baseline model in 2001-2007
20Table 8: FDI stocks by NACE 2 letter sectors: 1993-2007
NACE Description WlnFDI lnFMP Adj. R-sq. Obs.
AB Agriculture 0.85* * -1.15** 0.78 143
C Mining and quarrying 1.98** -0.62** 0.73 140
D Manufacturing 0.18 0.24* 0.9 148
DA Food products 0.024 -0.12 0.82 137
DB Textiles -0.27 0.34* 0.74 120
DC Leather 0.89** 0.94** 0.57 93
DD Wood 0.49* -0.57** 0.75 121
DE Paper -0.27 -0.061 0.78 104
DF Fuel 3.12** -0.23 0.48 86
DG Chemicals. -0.43** 0.13 0.86 125
DH Rubber and plastic -0.057 0.52** 0.91 120
DI Other mineral pr. 0.15 0.52** 0.85 114
DJ Metals 1.05** 0.53* 0.69 137
DK Machinery and equipment 0.21 0.35 0.84 121
DL Electrical and optical 0.066 -0.17 0.87 125
DM Transport equipment -0.25 1.00** 0.79 126
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. -1.02** 1.61** 0.3 112
E Electricity, gas and water supply 0.6 0.17 0.57 132
F Construction 0.69** 0.41** 0.84 145
G Trade 0.30** 0.035 0.87 148
H Hotels and restaurants 0.44** -0.27 0.68 143
I Transport and communication 0.98** -0.21 0.73 148
J Financial intermediation 0.69** -0.03 0.84 148
K Real estate and business activities 0.81** -0.50** 0.86 148
M Education 0.37 -0.57* 0.49 72
N Health and social work 0.43 -0.39 0.5 83
O Other services 0.31 -0.21 0.75 104
Baseline model speci￿cation separately estimated for each of the NACE 2-digit level industry. The dependent variable
is the log of FDI stock in country i in industry k available from the wiiw FDI database. The sample includes Eastern
European countries (excluding Serbia and Montenegro), Russia, and Ukraine.
217. Conclusions
This paper estimates the degree of spatial spillovers of FDI and in￿uence of foreign market
potential on FDI in transition countries during 1993-2007. Previous research has emphasized the
importance of the foreign market potential for FDI location. More recently, the importance of
spatial spillovers for outward FDI activities of US ￿rms found to be important, although not
robust for di￿erent groups of countries. This study ￿nds a substantial complementarity of FDI in
transition countries which is robust to di￿erent model speci￿cations and di￿erent aggregation of
data. The foreign market potential, on the other hand, is not always a signi￿cant determinant of
FDI.
As the analysis of sub-samples of the data indicates, the FDI complementarity is extremely
important for new markets, such as services sector which was substantially underdeveloped in the
socialist countires, but the complementarity weakens when the market matures and the size of
internal and external markets starts playing a dominant role in the FDI location decision. It also
indicates di￿erences in dominant modes of FDI in the two sub-regions ￿ more horizontal FDI in the
EE region, and more complex vertical FDI in the CIS region. The spillovers are more pronounced
for the CIS countries, while the foregin market potential is not statistically signi￿cant. At the
same time, the spatial spillovers are not signi￿cant for the EE countries during 2001-2007. The
positive spatial spillovers of the FDI stock in neighboring countries on FDI in￿ows into a country
are stronger at the early stages of transition ￿ an additional indication that FDI spillovers are more
pronounced at the earlier stages of development.
The outlined facts bring about an important policy implication ￿ internalizaion of spatial
spillovers across di￿erent countries in a region (e.g. by coordinating e￿orts) substantially increases
chances to attract FDI to poor, developing countries.
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